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McClellan: Bristol-Myers Squibb and Nationwide Class Actions

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT OF
CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY, ET AL: A DEATH
KNELL FOR NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTIONS?
Annie McClellan*

I. INTRODUCTION
Class action lawsuits trace back to thirteenth century England, which
permitted “group litigation” for the efficiency of hearing cases during a
time when travel was difficult.1 Although the concept died in England,
the notion of congregating claims was introduced to American courts in
the 1800s and has since become a tenet of modern-day litigation.2
Eventually this group litigation rule was codified as Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 in 1938.3 The rule has undergone numerous changes over
the years.4 The Supreme Court’s 2017 decision, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, et al., a case that
does not actually directly discuss class actions, arguably has had the most
recent significant impact on the success of certifying classes.
This Comment addresses whether Bristol-Myers Squibb in effect
forbids the use of nationwide class actions.5 Section II provides a
background of personal jurisdiction, class actions, Bristol-Myers Squibb,
and several district court decisions that Bristol-Myers Squibb has recently
influenced. Section III closely examines the language of Bristol-Myers
Squibb and predicts how that language will likely affect lower court
rulings in subsequent years. Section III also analyzes the impact of
Bristol-Myers Squibb on district court personal jurisdiction class action
decisions by reexamining the district court decisions outlined in Section
II. Finally, Section III argues that specifically Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3) class actions are the type of class action to be most
affected by this latest Supreme Court ruling.

*Associate Member, 2017-2018 University of Cincinnati Law Review. Thank you to Michael E. Solimine,
University of Cincinnati Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, for your guidance with this submission.
Thank you to my family, friends, and editors for your support.
1. “History of Class Action Lawsuits,” CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS CENTER (2018),
https://classactionlawsuitcenter.com/history-of-class-action-lawsuits/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2018).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Nationwide class actions are those in which all or some members in the plaintiff class are not
from or injured in the forum state.
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II. BACKGROUND
Class actions are closely tied to personal jurisdiction issues because
such lawsuits frequently involve plaintiffs living in and injured in
numerous states throughout the country. Part (a) discusses personal
jurisdiction and the two types of personal jurisdiction the Supreme Court
recognizes. Part (b) notes the present state of federal law regarding class
actions. Part (c) addresses the Supreme Court’s recent personal
jurisdiction decision from the 2016-2017 term—Bristol-Myers Squibb—
released in June of 2017, and Part (d) examines some of the subsequent
federal district courts’ decisions on personal jurisdiction affecting class
actions since the Supreme Court’s June decision.6
a. Personal Jurisdiction
A court has authority to adjudicate an individual’s rights when it has
personal, or territorial, jurisdiction over the people or property in the
action.7 Personal jurisdiction is limited by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which states that “no state shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law.”8
“Property” in this clause can refer to a legal claim or cause of action,9 and
this protection applies to both plaintiffs and defendants.10 While a
plaintiff’s choice of forum is generally favored, if the plaintiff chooses a
forum outside of its home, less deference is given.11
State legislatures determine the amount of authority state courts have
over nonresident defendants.12 All states now have long-arm statutes to
provide their state courts with personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants who cannot be served in the forum state.13 There are two types
of long arm statutes.14 One is a laundry list approach that specifies factual

6. These cases were chosen based on how directly the courts discuss Bristol-Myers Squibb in
advocating for their stances. At the time this Article was written, several months after the Supreme Court’s
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s ruling, there were a limited quantity of cases to choose from at the district court
level and none had any appellate decisions yet.
7. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 99 (4th ed. 2005).
8. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
9. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Legal Claims as Private Property: Implications for Eminent
Domain, 36:3 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY 373, 373 (2009).
10. See, e.g., The Law Office of Stephen O’Rear, P.C., Assignment of Causes of Action in Texas,
FORT WORTH INJURY LAWYER BLOG (June 25, 2013), https://www.fortworthinjurylawyerblog.com/2013/06/assignment-of-causes-of-action-in-texas.html (referring to a defendant’s ability to
assign a cause of action against an insurance company to the plaintiff).
11. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 265-66 (1981).
12. RICHARD L. MARCUS, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 737 (7th ed. 2018).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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circumstances where due process requirements would likely be
satisfied.15 Such statutes then require a separate analysis to ensure
whether personal jurisdiction over the defendant comports with the
Constitution.16 The other type of long arm statute employs a blanket
approach, which permits all jurisdiction permitted by state and federal
constitutional law.17
There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction and
specific, which are described respectively. 18
i. General Jurisdiction
General jurisdiction is, in essence, “all-purpose” jurisdiction.19 General
jurisdiction is established if an “individual’s domicile” is within the given
forum.20 For corporations, general jurisdiction is established by an
“equivalent place” to an individual’s domicile—“one in which the
corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”21 When general jurisdiction
exists, a court can hear a greater variety of claims by a plaintiff, even if
the events giving rise to the claim occurred in a different state.22
Continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state may be sufficient
to establish general jurisdiction, especially where the defendant
purposefully availed itself of the forum state’s laws.23 After the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown
and Daimler AG v. Bauman, in 2011 and 2014 respectively, the place of
incorporation and the principal place of business are the main components
utilized by courts to establish general jurisdiction over corporations
today.24
If the easier general jurisdiction is not found, courts transition to a more
fact-intensive specific jurisdiction analysis. 25

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 754 (2014).
19. Id. at 758.
20. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 919.
23. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985).
24. 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011); 134 S.Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
25. Andrew D. Bradt and D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers
Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 1251, 1271
(2018).
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ii. Specific Jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction is, in essence, “case-linked” jurisdiction.26
Specific jurisdiction requires a lawsuit to “aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.”27 There must be an “affiliatio[n]
between the forum and the underlying controversy”; some sort of relevant
situation must occur in that state.28 The defendant, if not present in the
state, must have minimum contacts with the forum such that the exercise
of personal jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.29 Moreover, the defendant must have purposefully
availed itself to the privileges of conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of the state’s law such
that it is foreseeable the defendant would be haled into court there.30
The requirement of minimum contacts was established in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington.31 There, orders for shoes were processed and
shipped from out of state.32 However, the “contacts” to the state in this
case were $31,000 in commissions, a dozen salesmen, shoe displays,
rented sample rooms, rented exhibit buildings, and rented hotel rooms.33
These contacts were enough to avoid violations of traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice when the state exercised personal
jurisdiction over the company.34
A series of decisions have addressed the concept of minimum contacts.
For example, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. articulated the least
possible contacts necessary to still find specific jurisdiction.35 In McGee,
there was a mere life insurance policy connecting the defendant to that
state, and that was deemed enough for the exercise of jurisdiction to
comport with “fair play and substantial justice.”36
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson clarified the five factors
identifying whether traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
are violated by a court exercising personal jurisdiction over a party. 37 The
factors are (1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the forum state’s interest

26. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
27. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, n. 8 (1984).
28. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
29. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
30. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
31. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
32. Id. at 314.
33. Id. at 313-14.
34. Id. at 316, 321.
35. 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
36. Id. at 221-23.
37. 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss3/7

4

McClellan: Bristol-Myers Squibb and Nationwide Class Actions

2019]

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB AND NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTIONS

833

in adjudicating the dispute, enforcing laws, or providing redress for its
citizens, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief, (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution, and (5) the furtherance of fundamental substantive
social policies.38 In World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiff suffered a car
accident in Oklahoma, but the car was purchased in New York by New
York residents.39 The Supreme Court found that there was no specific
personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma just because the car accident happened
to occur while the plaintiffs were passing through the state.40 The Court
coined the accident as an “isolated occurrence” that did not rise to a level
of establishing specific jurisdiction.41
The due process analysis for personal jurisdiction requires more than
minimum contacts and the fulfillment of traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.42 The quality and nature of the minimum contacts
must be such that the defendant, through those contacts, “purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”43
Justice Brennan ordered the analysis in Burger King in 1985 when he
used a two-step inquiry.44 First, the defendant must have “purposefully
established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum State.”45 If sufficient
contacts are present, then jurisdiction is presumptively reasonable.46
However, the presumption may be overcome in the second inquiry if it
can be shown that jurisdiction would not comport with traditional notions
of “fair play and substantial justice,” as set out in World-Wide
Volkswagen.47
This was the state of the law of specific personal jurisdiction prior to
the Supreme Court’s Bristol-Myers Squibb decision in June of 2017.
Some argue that specific personal jurisdiction law has not changed in light
of Bristol-Myers Squibb.48 However, this Comment argues otherwise,
especially for specific personal jurisdiction in class actions.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 295.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
43. Id. at 253.
44. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
45. Id.
46. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 7, at 154.
47. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
48. See, e.g., Casso’s Wellness Store & Gym, L.L.C. v. Spectrum Lab. Prods., Inc., No. 17-2161,
2018 WL 1377608 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2018).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

5

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 7

834

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

b. Class Actions
A court must have personal jurisdiction over all plaintiffs and all
defendants in a lawsuit.49 Thus, even before Bristol-Myers Squibb,
personal jurisdiction was a tenuous issue with larger class actions,
because there were many players involved.50 Class actions, representative
lawsuits in which several individuals sue on behalf of many class
members similarly situated,51 are governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.52 In order to certify a class action, all four prongs of Rule
23(a) must be satisfied, and one of the three prongs of 23(b) must be
satisfied.53
The prerequisites of 23(a) are (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3)
typicality, and (4) adequacy.54 Numerosity means that there are so many
class members that mere joinder of parties is impracticable.55 The
presence of common issues of law or fact means that class members have
suffered the same injury, such that there is a common contention
“answerable in one fell swoop.”56 Typicality means that the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class.57 Finally, representative parties must fairly and adequately
protect the interests of a class when there is a shared interest between the
representatives and other class members and there is an unlikelihood of
collusion among class representatives.58
Rule 23(b) establishes several types of class actions.59 Rule
23(b)(1)(A) class actions result when separate actions by individual
parties would create a risk of inconsistent decisions, which would
establish irreconcilable standards of conduct for the opposing party.60
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions are found when plaintiffs’ individual
abilities to win would be impeded or impaired if the lawsuits were all
49. Personal
Jurisdiction,
LEGAL
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE
(2018),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/personal_jurisdiction (last visited Apr. 26, 2018) (referring to the
exercise of power over a “party” in the case, not just the plaintiff or just the defendant).
50. See In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in Gulf of Mexico, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D.
La. 2012), aff’d 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014); In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury
Litig., 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016).
51. MARCUS, supra note 12, at 308-11.
52. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
53. MARCUS, supra note 12, at 317-29.
54. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-(4).
55. MARCUS, supra note 12, at 328-29.
56. Jeffrey E. Crane, A New Battleground in Class Actions: The Commonality Requirement of
23(a)(2),
INSURANCE
AND
REINSURANCE
LAW
REPORT
30,
31
(2012),
https://www2.sidley.com/files/upload/2012_IRLR_NEW_BATTLEGROUND.pdf.
57. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 7, at 762.
58. MARCUS, supra note 12, at 324-25.
59. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
60. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
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separate.61 Rule 23(b)(2) class actions exist when the opposing party’s
actions or lack of actions generally apply to the whole class, thus making
injunctive or declaratory relief the most appropriate form of relief.62
Finally, Rule 23(b)(3) authorizes the class action device when the court
finds that the “questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”63
Rule 23 exemplifies the due process requirements of class actions.64 A
court must look past the pleadings for the certification decision.65 A court
must understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable
substantive law in order to make a meaningful determination of the
certification issues.66 That courts should not consider the merits on class
certification has long been a tenet in class action procedure.67 And
although the recent Supreme Court decision, Bristol-Myers Squibb, did
not deal explicitly with a class action on the facts, this personal
jurisdiction case will surely have profound implications on class actions
and will likely be a new “staple of first-year Civil Procedure courses
everywhere.”68
c. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San
Francisco County, et al.
Bristol-Myers Squibb (“BMS”) is a pharmaceutical company that
manufactures and sells Plavix, a prescription drug that thins blood and
prevents clotting.69 BMS developed, manufactured, labelled, and
packaged Plavix, created a market strategy for Plavix, and worked on the
regulatory approval of Plavix in New Jersey and New York.70 Across the
country in California, BMS had, at the time of the decision, five research
facilities, employed several hundred employees, and took in over $900
million in Plavix pill sales over a six-year timespan.71 However, BMS

61. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
62. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
63. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
64. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (requiring “notice” throughout).
65. See, e.g., AmChem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (1997) (analysis of whether class
certification was correct included a look at fairness proceedings, settlement discussions, and final
settlement).
66. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996).
67. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
68. Bradt & Rave, supra note 25, at 1253.
69. Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1777-78 (2017).
70. Id. at 1778.
71. Id.
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maintained substantial operations in New York and New Jersey, with over
half of its employees working in these two states.72 The corporation is
headquartered in New York and incorporated in Delaware.73
Hundreds of plaintiffs sued BMS in California state court for injuries
allegedly caused by Plavix.74 Almost 600 plaintiffs resided in states
outside of California, and less than 100 plaintiffs resided in California.75
The claims were based exclusively on California state law, including
products liability, negligent misrepresentation, and misleading
advertising laws.76 The plaintiffs did not allege that California physicians
provided the drug, that injuries occurred in California, or that treatment
occurred in California.77 The suit was not brought as a class action,
despite hundreds of plaintiffs, because the plaintiffs wanted to avoid the
removal of the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act.78
BMS asserted a lack of personal jurisdiction regarding the
nonresidents, but the California Superior Court denied the motion, finding
general jurisdiction because of BMS’s “extensive activities in the State”
of California.79 The State Court of Appeals eventually held that general
jurisdiction was not present, after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Daimler AG v. Bauman,80 because BMS is incorporated in Delaware and
headquartered in New York.81 In other words, incorporation did not occur
in and headquarters were not located in California. However, the Court of
Appeals found that specific jurisdiction over the nonresident claims was
present.82 The California Supreme Court agreed on the presence of
specific jurisdiction, using a sliding scale approach,83 which
acknowledged that the “more wide ranging the defendant’s forum
contacts, the more readily is shown a connection between the forum
contacts and the claim.”84 Put differently, the sliding scale meant that
“more extensive contacts with the forum state would offset a weak
connection to nonresident plaintiffs’ claims.”85 The Supreme Court of the
72. Id. at 1777-78.
73. Id. at 1777.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1778.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Bradt & Rave, supra note 25, at 1255.
79. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1775.
80. 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014) (holding that general jurisdiction over a corporation exists if the
corporation’s connections are so continuous and systematic as to make the corporation basically at home
in that forum state).
81. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1775.
82. Id. at 1778.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Brian A. Troyer, “District Courts Divide Over Application of ‘Bristol-Myers Squibb’ Decision
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United States heard this case on the question of whether the exercise of
jurisdiction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.86
The Supreme Court was concerned with California’s sliding scale
approach.87 The Court criticized the sliding scale approach as too relaxed.
If the defendant had extensive forum contacts, but such contacts were
unrelated to the claims, then the forum’s connection to the claims did not
matter as much.88 The Court found that there was an insufficient
connection between the forum of California and the claims for these
hundreds of plaintiffs.89 There was not enough to find the necessary
connection even though the other plaintiffs received and ingested Plavix
in California, BMS conducted research in California, and BMS contracted
with a California distributor.90 The court reasoned that since an “isolated
occurrence” of an automobile accident in Oklahoma was not enough for
the Court to find personal jurisdiction in World-Wide Volkswagen, there
was an even weaker connection to California in this case, as no injury
occurred there.91
The Supreme Court also distinguished the case from its Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. ruling from 1984.92 In Keeton, a New York
plaintiff sued a New Hampshire defendant, which distributed its products
throughout the country, including in New Hampshire.93 The Supreme
Court noted that specific jurisdiction was present in Keeton because of the
connection between the distribution of the product in New Hampshire and
the alleged damage that occurred there.94 Alternatively, the plaintiffs in
Bristol-Myers Squibb did not allege any harm in California, where BMS
distributed its product.95
Justice Sotomayor, in her Bristol-Myers Squibb dissent, voiced the
concern that lower courts are expressing today. She emphasized that “the
to Class Actions,” THE WLF LEGAL PULSE (Feb. 5, 2018), https://wlflegalpulse.com/2018/02/05/districtcourts-divide-over-application-of-bristol-myers-squibb-decision-to-class-actions/ (emphasis added).
86. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1779.
87. Id. at 1781.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1782; 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
92. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1782.
93. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 772-74 (1984)).
94. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1782 (noting further that Keeton regarded “the scope of a
claim involving in-state injury and injury to residents of the State, not, as in [Bristol-Myers Squibb],
jurisdiction to entertain claims involving no in-state injury and no injury to residents of the forum State.
Keeton held that there was jurisdiction in New Hampshire to consider the full measure of the plaintiff’s
claim, but whether she could actually recover out-of-state damages was a merits question governed by
New Hampshire libel law.”)
95. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1782.
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majority’s rule will make it difficult to aggregate the claims of plaintiffs
across the country whose claims may be worth little alone.”96 She noted
that bifurcation of claims and “piecemeal litigation” will occur because
bringing state claim mass actions against defendants whose main forums
are different states will be nearly impossible.97 Justice Sotomayor found
that California courts could exercise specific jurisdiction over the
nonresident plaintiffs’ claims because BMS purposefully availed itself of
the pharmaceutical industry in the state and the plaintiffs’ claims related
to BMS’s instate conduct.98 She noted that jurisdiction was reasonable
because BMS was already facing identical claims from the approximately
100 California plaintiffs.99 Separate suits in the other plaintiffs’ resident
states would prove far more cumbersome for BMS.100 Justice Sotomayor
saw the majority’s decision as handing corporate defendants one
additional advantage,101 especially if plaintiffs try to bring a mass action
against two or more defendants headquartered in different states.102
Several lower district courts have already started confronting these
adverse notions presented by the Bristol-Myers Squibb majority and
Justice Sotomayor.
d. Lower Court Decisions Since Bristol-Myers Squibb Ruling
In the past few months since the Supreme Court’s 8-1 Bristol-Myers
Squibb ruling, many district courts have wrestled with whether BristolMyers Squibb affects their previous personal jurisdiction and class action
analyses.103 Unfortunately for class plaintiffs, seemingly more courts than
not are finding that Bristol-Myers Squibb does have an effect, despite
Justice Alito’s contention in his majority opinion that the case makes no
new law.104
Three district court cases, from the Northern District of Illinois, the
Northern District of California, and the Eastern District of Missouri, are
addressed in the following sections to demonstrate that Justice Alito’s
96. Id. at 1784.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1786.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1789.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Everett v. Aurora Pump Co., No. 4:17CV230 HEA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4851
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 11, 2018); Gonzalez-Camacho v. Banco Popular De P.R., No. 17-1448 (DRD), 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 55104 (D.P.R. Mar. 28, 2018); Atlantica Holdings, Inc. v. Sovereign Wealth Fund SamrukKazyna JSC, Nos. 12-CV-8852 (JMF), 13-CV-5790 (JMF), 2018 WL 922191 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018);
Erwin v. Ford Motor Co., 309 F. Supp. 3d 229 (D. Del. 2018); Oliver v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-06950,
2017 WL 3193652 (S.D.W. Va. July 27, 2017).
104. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 25, at 1255-56.
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precursory opinion does not reflect reality.
i. Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd.
The Northern District of Illinois in Greene v. Mizuho Bank noted key
implications of Bristol-Myers Squibb that affected the court’s outcome.105
In Greene, a putative class action106 was filed by several users of bitcoin
who lost funds when the defendant bank caused problems with
withdrawals.107 In light of the Bristol-Myers Squibb decision, which came
out while Greene was being litigated, the defendant bank argued that the
court lacked jurisdiction over one of the class members because the
complaint did not allege that the defendant had any contacts with Illinois
in connection with that plaintiff’s claims.108 While the claims were very
similar to the claims of other plaintiffs, who were residents of Illinois, the
court determined that under Bristol-Myers Squibb, such similarity was not
enough to establish jurisdiction over the defendant in connection with that
plaintiff.109
The plaintiffs in Greene additionally argued that the distinction
between a putative class action in that case versus a mass action in BristolMyers Squibb was significant.110 Mass actions and class actions treat
plaintiffs differently.111 In a mass action, plaintiffs are treated as
individuals, with facts needing to be established for each person.112
Alternatively, in a class action, a class representative stands for the entire
class and all of the members are treated as one plaintiff.113 The Northern
District of Illinois, however, rejected this distinction, noting that BristolMyers Squibb announced “a general principle—that due process requires
a ‘connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue’”—when
establishing jurisdiction.114 The court specifically noted that “nothing in
Bristol-Myers [Squibb] suggests that it does not apply to named plaintiffs

105. 289 F. Supp. 3d 870, 875-77 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
106. A putative class action is a class action that has not yet been certified by the court. Once a
putative class is certified, it simply becomes a class action. Putative Class Action, INTERNATIONAL RISK
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, INC., https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/putative-class-action
(last visited Mar. 11, 2018).
107. Greene, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 872.
108. Id. at 874.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. What’s the Difference Between a Class Action and a Mass Tort (Mass Action)?, STARR
AUSTEN & MILLER LLP (2018), http://www.starrausten.com/resources/what-is-the-difference-betweena-class-action-and-a-mass-tort-mass-action/.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Greene, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 874.
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in a putative class action,”115 even though Bristol-Myers Squibb only
technically dealt with a mass action.116
The plaintiffs further argued that pendent personal jurisdiction enabled
specific jurisdiction over one plaintiff’s claims. Pendant personal
jurisdiction consists of “jurisdiction over a defendant with respect to a
claim for which there is no independent basis of personal jurisdiction so
long as it arises out of a common nucleus of operative facts with a claim
in the same suit over which the court does have personal jurisdiction.”117
The Greene court struck down this argument too in light of Bristol-Myers
Squibb.118 The court noted that Bristol-Myers Squibb now limits pendent
personal jurisdiction, though without giving any justification.119
Perhaps most remarkably, due to its rarity, the court in Greene excused
an issue of forfeiture for the defendant in light of Bristol-Myers Squibb.120
A party forfeits a theory, claim, or argument when it fails to argue it at an
earlier opportunity.121 When a party does not make the argument, the
opportunity to make the argument subsequently is not allowed, or
“forfeited.”122 The Greene court noted that the Bristol-Myers Squibb
decision in the middle of this litigation had a significant enough impact
to necessitate such extreme lenity towards the defendant’s initial
forfeitures of several arguments.123
ii. In re Nexus 6P Products Liability Litigation
In In re Nexus 6P Products Liability Litigation, the Northern District
of California granted one defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, although allowing leave to amend.124 The court held
that the plaintiffs fell short of establishing general jurisdiction and
specific jurisdiction, in light of Bristol-Myers Squibb.125 In In re Nexus
6P, the plaintiffs alleged major defects in Google and Huawei Device
USA (“Huawei”)’s Nexus 6P smartphones.126 They claimed that the
115. Id.
116. See Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California, 137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017).
117. BRENT A. OLSEN, Personal Jurisdiction – Pendent Jurisdiction, 20A1 MINN. PRAC., BUSINESS
LAW DESKBOOK, ADVANCED TOPICS IN BUSINESS LAW § 16B:140 (Nov. 2017 update).
118. Greene, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 875.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 876-77.
121. Id. at 876 (“[T]he forfeiture doctrine applies not only to a litigant’s failure to raise a general
argument . . . but also to a litigant’s failure to advance a specific point in support of a general argument .
. . .” (citing Milligan v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 686 F.3d 378, 386 (7th Cir. 2012))).
122. Greene, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 876.
123. Id. at 877.
124. No. 17-cv-02185-BLF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23622, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018).
125. Id. at *8, *16.
126. Id. at *3.
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Northern District of California had general and specific jurisdiction over
defendant Huawei, despite the defendant’s place of incorporation and
principal place of business being in Texas.127 The plaintiffs argued this
because the defendant “ha[d] conducted substantial business in [the
Northern California] judicial district and intentionally and purposefully
placed the [p]hones into the stream of commerce within this district and
throughout the United States.”128
The court denied finding general jurisdiction over Huawei because the
plaintiffs did not show that research activities of Huawei went beyond a
“‘substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business’ to contacts
so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render Huawei ‘essentially at home’
in California.”129 Similarly, finding that specific jurisdiction was lacking,
the court cited Bristol-Myers Squibb in noting that Huawei’s collaborative
effort with California-based Google did not, by itself, confer specific
jurisdiction.130 Plaintiffs also alleged that Huawei conducted research and
had developmental facilities in California, but the court noted that these
contacts were irrelevant under Bristol-Myers Squibb for purposes of
specific jurisdiction if the research and development were unrelated to the
Nexus 6P.131
iii. Jordan v. Bayer Corp.
The Eastern District of Missouri interpreted Bristol-Myers Squibb
strictly in Jordan v. Bayer Corporation in February of 2018.132 The court
dismissed a claim brought by non-Missouri plaintiffs for lack of personal
jurisdiction, in light of the Bristol-Myers Squibb ruling.133 The Jordan
plaintiffs argued that the background section of the Bristol-Myers Squibb
opinion provided litigants with a “blueprint” for asserting personal
jurisdiction over nonresident claims.134 Specifically, the plaintiffs cited
the portion of Bristol-Myers Squibb that notes that BMS “did not develop
Plavix in California, did not create a marketing strategy for Plavix in
California, and did not manufacture, label, package, or work on the
regulatory approval of the product in California.”135 The plaintiffs in
Jordan claimed that they satisfied this supposed “blueprint” by asserting

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *8 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 761 (2014)).
In re Nexus 6P, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23622, at *12.
Id. at *13-14.
No. 4:17-cv-00865-AGF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23244, at *11 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2018).
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id.
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that the defendant used Missouri as “ground zero” for its national
campaign and that Missouri was the location for numerous clinical trials
regarding the drug at issue in the case.136
The Jordan court, however, did not find these assertions persuasive. It
instead emphasized that Bristol-Myers Squibb requires narrower
assertions for personal jurisdiction to be determined than the general
presence of marketing strategies and clinical trials. 137 That Missouri
happened to be the first marketed area for the product throughout the
United States was irrelevant to the court.138 The court took issue with the
fact that the plaintiffs did not allege that they themselves actually saw the
product being advertised in Missouri or that they themselves actually
participated in the clinical trials happening in Missouri.139 That the nonMissouri plaintiffs did not see marketing in Missouri, were not prescribed
the product in Missouri, were not injured by the product in Missouri, and
did not purchase the product in Missouri were all notable reasons,
grounded in Bristol-Myers Squibb, for the court to deny specific personal
jurisdiction over the defendant in the state.140
III. DISCUSSION
Bristol-Myers Squibb will surely pose barriers to the successful
certification of nationwide class actions in years to come, even though its
impact will likely not be great enough to serve as a complete death
knell141 for nationwide class actions. Part (a) below dissects the language
of Bristol-Myers Squibb in light of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent and
addresses what general implications such language will likely have on
class actions going forward. Part (b) analyzes Jordan and Greene to see
how Bristol-Myers Squibb is already reshaping present-day class action
case law. Finally, Part (c) delves into the four types of class actions
articulated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) to consider how
Bristol-Myers Squibb will impact one type more than the others.
a. The Language of Bristol-Myers Squibb and What it Means for Class
Actions Going Forward
The Court’s analysis in Bristol-Myers Squibb appears flawed in light
of personal jurisdiction precedent. The Court cites International Shoe,
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id. at *11 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
“Death knell” is used in the colloquial manner in this Comment.
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Hanson, and World-Wide Volkswagen in its approach to the law.142
However, it then ignores the ideas of minimum contacts, the traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice along with the attendant WorldWide Volkswagen factors, and purposeful availment. Instead, the Court
emphasizes that “all the conduct giving rise to the nonresidents’ claims
occurred elsewhere.”143
As Justice Sotomayor alludes to in her dissent, this is simply not what
specific jurisdiction precedent requires.144 Settled specific jurisdiction
precedent from International Shoe, Hanson, World-Wide Volkswagen,
and several other cases clearly does not require that an “‘adequate link’
exist ‘between the State and nonresidents’ claims,’” like the BristolMyers Squibb majority contends.145 What is required from these previous
cases is an analysis of (a) whether the party has minimum contacts with
the forum state such that traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice are not violated,146 (b) whether the party purposefully availed itself
of the laws and protections of the forum state,147 and (c) whether the party
could foresee being haled into court there.148 International Shoe, Hanson,
and World-Wide Volkswagen do not use the phrases “adequate link” or
“adequate linkage.”149
The Court may not have gone into a deeper analysis of reasonableness
or of fair play and substantial justice because the Court thought the first
prong of the Burger King two-part test had not been met. However, this
is not immediately clear in the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion. Regardless,
the Court incorrectly ignored basic precedent and rewrote personal
jurisdiction law to necessitate this “adequate link.”
Despite this potential break with precedent, lower courts are
constrained to follow the Court’s newfound concern with “adequate link.”
Justice Alito highlighted this issue with his phrasing throughout the
opinion: “all the conduct giving rise to the nonresidents’ claims occurred
elsewhere,” “nor is it sufficient . . . that [the defendant company]
conducted research,” and “that other plaintiffs were [injured] in
California . . . does not allow the State to assert specific jurisdiction over
the nonresidents’ claims.” Courts will now cite this language in finding
142. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1782.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
145. Id.
146. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
147. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
148. Id.; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
149. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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that there is no jurisdiction. Because Bristol-Myers Squibb emphasizes
“adequate link,” the case can be interpreted as adding a new element to
personal jurisdiction tests, at least for the first prong of Burger King.
b. The Impact Bristol-Myers Squibb is Already Having on Class Actions
Bristol-Myers Squibb is clearly already affecting the manner in which
lower courts treat class actions.150 Perhaps most significant is the
heightened need for class members to now show how they each,
individually, have a significant enough connection to the defendant(s) in
the suit, shown through concrete, individualized evidence.
Jordan seemingly stands for the proposition that plaintiff assertions
need to be narrower and more specific than was required pre-BristolMyers Squibb. If more courts adopt the notion of Jordan, nonresident
plaintiffs themselves must have deeper ties related to the defendant(s)
within the state of filing. This will notably be more and more difficult to
achieve the larger classes are; counsel will be forced to do extensive
analyses into each individual, nonresident, class client when attempting
to determine if a forum is appropriate. Counsel will have to look more indepth at how connected each individual nonresident is to the defendant
within the state of filing. Jordan leads to additional questions that counsel
may now have to ask: Was something other than general marketing and
clinical trials occurring in the state? Did each, individual plaintiff see the
advertising that occurred by the defendant in that state? Did each,
individual plaintiff participate in a clinical trial in that state?
Answering these questions may be too arduous for counsel to the point
where it becomes infeasible to take on a class action matter. Even if
counsel decides to keep a case, the analysis about the best forum, based
on which plaintiffs actually have sufficient ties to the defendant in a state,
will be more expensive. Counsel will have to spend more time analyzing
whether the court will have personal jurisdiction over the defendant in
relation to every individual, nonresident plaintiff. Ironically, class actions
were designed to avoid such in-depth, time-consuming discoveries.151
One policy reason for class actions was to reduce the time spent on any
one, particular case.152 The idea is to combine similar enough cases to
reduce the need to research each one in great detail.153
Even more indicative of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s effect on class actions
is the Greene court’s outright rejection of the plaintiffs’ argument that
150. See, e.g., supra note 103.
151. Roger Bernstein, Judicial Economy and Class Actions, 7.2 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
349, 352-53 (1978).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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Bristol-Myers Squibb does not apply to class actions.154 Such a holding is
a near death knell for class actions in the Northern District of Illinois
because that means that class members will, like in Jordan, have to plead
a connection to the defendant in that given forum for every single,
individual plaintiff. Finding that Bristol-Myers Squibb applied in Greene
and that the plaintiffs did not plead enough for jurisdiction to be found
will make it extremely difficult for classes going forward in the Northern
District of Illinois, for the same reasons indicated above; time and
expenses will only increase for class action counsel, when time and
expenses are already so high. The burden of upfront time and costs may
become so high for plaintiff attorneys that the investment is not worth the
possible reward. Plaintiffs may have to bring individual claims instead,
which may not be worth doing if each possible payout is negligible.
Moreover, the fact that the Greene court excused the defendant’s initial
forfeiture of its claim that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
defendant indicates the strength of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s effect on
personal jurisdiction arguments going forward. Forfeiture happens when
a party does not present an argument at the first possible time. 155 Courts
only hear forfeited issues under several exceptions, one of which is
“changes in the law.”156 Therefore, it is reasonably deducible that the
Greene court excused the defendant’s forfeiture of its lack of personal
jurisdiction argument, because it thought that Bristol-Myers Squibb
sufficiently changed the law of finding personal jurisdiction.
As these cases indicate, Bristol-Myers Squibb poses many new barriers
to establishing specific jurisdiction over defendants in relation to every
single plaintiff in a nationwide class action. Authors of an amicus curie
brief submitted to the Supreme Court during the Bristol-Myers Squibb
litigation go so far as to claim that class actions will now only survive if
brought in the defendant’s home state, where general jurisdiction will
undoubtedly be found.157
More remarkably, district court splits are just beginning to form. 158 In
DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc.,159 the Northern District of Illinois ruled that
Bristol-Myers Squibb does apply to absent class members.160 The
plaintiffs’ claims in that case, which were in part tied to nonresident,

154. Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d 870, 874 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
155. Melissa M. Devine, When the Courts Save Parties from Themselves: A Practitioner’s Guide
to the Federal Circuit and the Court of International Trade, 21 TUL. J. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW 329, 331
(Apr. 2013).
156. Id. at 335.
157. Bradt & Rave, supra note 25, at 1252.
158. Troyer, supra note 85.
159. No. 17 C 6125, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7947 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018).
160. Troyer, supra note 85.
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absent plaintiffs, were dismissed.161 Alternatively, Fitzhenry-Russell v.
Dr. Pepper Snapple Group162 did not apply Bristol-Myers Squibb to class
actions.163 A commentator noted that in Fitzhenry-Russell, “claims of
absent class members [were] not before the court for purposes of
jurisdiction over the defendant,” so the claims of nonresident, absent class
members were not dismissed.164
The DeBernardis court predicted that “based on the Supreme Court’s
comments about federalism[,] the courts will apply Bristol-Myers Squibb
to outlaw nationwide class actions in form, such as in this case, where
there is no general jurisdiction over the Defendants.”165 Since this is only
happening in some courts, not all—as DeBernardis predicted—the issue
will soon be ripe for the Supreme Court, so that it can revisit the
implications of personal jurisdiction on class actions. If the circuit courts
affirm their lower court rulings, a circuit split will arise, requiring the
Supreme Court to revisit what it sparked with the Bristol-Myers Squibb
decision.166 Meanwhile, before such revisiting occurs, Bristol-Myers
Squibb will continue to influence certain types of class actions more than
others.
c. The Implications of Bristol-Myers Squibb on the Different Types of
Class Actions
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 establishes four different types of
class actions.167 The fourth type, a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, is one where
“questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior
to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.”168 Four factors are used to analyze these predominance and
superiority requirements of 23(b)(3) class actions: (A) the class members’
interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.169 Rule

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
No. 17-cv-00564, 2017 WL 4224723 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017).
Troyer, supra note 85.
Id.
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7947, at *6.
Troyer, supra note 85.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b); supra Discussion II(b).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D).
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23(b)(3)(C), “the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum,” implicates personal
jurisdiction issues. The other types of class actions—23(b)(1)(A),
23(b)(1)(B), and 23(b)(2) class actions—do not require this particular
factor in their analyses.170 Therefore, 23(b)(3) class actions are the only
class type likely to be affected by Bristol-Myers Squibb.
Rule 23(b)(3)(C) has been read to embody two key points: a concern
for aggregation and a concern for geography.171 In considering whether a
court is geographically appropriate under a 23(b)(3)(C) predominance
and superiority analysis, courts look at the convenience of the parties,
whether the defendant is located in the forum state, and often whether it
is simply possible that the forum is no worse for the class participants than
alternative forums.172 When conducting a 23(b)(3)(C) analysis, courts
also consider: (1) the locus of the harm, (2) the concentration of other
events forming the basis of the action, and (3) the bulk of the proposed
class.173
Because these factors are largely related to jurisdictional ties to an area,
it is likely that defendants will now highlight 23(b)(3)(C) even more in
their fights against predominance and superiority post-Bristol-Myers
Squibb. Defendants will argue that “the locus of harm” being primarily
outside of a given forum will be enough to show “undesirability” of
concentrating the claims in that forum. They will point to many plaintiffs
being harmed outside of California as enough for the Bristol-Myers
Squibb court to find a lack of personal jurisdiction.174 If that is not enough
to find personal jurisdiction, defendants will then argue that there is not
enough to find a “desirability” of “concentrating the litigation.” In all, it
is likely that defendants fighting (b)(3) class certifications will point to
Bristol-Myers Squibb to show that (b)(3)(C) favors their argument of not
certifying. Bristol-Myers Squibb favors defendants, so (b)(3) classes will
likely now be more difficult to certify when defendants raise the notions
of that case during certification arguments.
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are additionally more likely to be affected
by Bristol-Myers Squibb than (b)(1) or (b)(2) classes because of the
extensive “cohesiveness” requirement for (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes.
“Cohesiveness” refers to whether the class’s claims are “common ones”
and that “adjudication of the case will not devolve into consideration of a
myriad of issues.”175 The Supreme Court of the United States has never
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)-(2).
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:71 (5th ed. Dec. 2017).
Id.
Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 306 F.R.D. 312, 411 (D.N.M. 2015).
Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California, 137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017).
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 171 at § 4:34.
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formally acknowledged a “cohesiveness” requirement for (b)(1) and
(b)(2) classes.176 However, innumerable lower courts have recognized
“cohesiveness” as necessary in their (b)(1) and (b)(2) analyses. 177 While
(b)(3) classes also require cohesiveness,178 (b)(2) classes usually require
more cohesiveness because unnamed members are not afforded the
opportunity to opt out.179
Because (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes require more cohesiveness, it is likely
that (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes will have less jurisdictional problems.
Because the classes need to be so cohesive for certification, it is probable
that “adequate links” between the forum and the specific claim will
exist.180 Since (b)(1) classes usually deal with limited funds181 and (b)(2)
classes are primarily for injunctive relief,182 the defendants and
nonresident plaintiffs will likely have enough general ties to a forum for
courts to find jurisdiction over the nonresidents under Bristol-Myers
Squibb.
However, because (b)(3) nationwide classes do not require as much
cohesiveness and because the class members have the opportunity to opt
out, it is likely that finding jurisdiction over all (b)(3) class members may
be more of an issue. Because less cohesiveness is required, a court may
find that facts adequate for (b)(3) certification are not actually enough to
find jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although a case that does not directly deal with class actions, BristolMyers Squibb’s personal jurisdiction implications will likely have a
negative effect on class certification for years to come. Justice Sotomayor
correctly emphasized that the language of the decision is concerning for

176. Id. at § 4:33.
177. Id. at § 4:34. Larsen v. JBC Legal Grp., P.C., 235 F.R.D. 191, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Rule
23(b)(2) certification presumes that the class is cohesive.”); Gates v. Rohm and Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255,
269 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Plaintiffs cannot show the cohesiveness required for certification of a Rule 23(b)(2)
class.”); M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 847 (5th Cir. 2012); Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins.
Co., 615 F.3d 1023, 1035 (8th Cir. 2010); Shook v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Cty. of El Paso, 543 F.3d
597, 604 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Rule 23(b)(2) demands a certain cohesiveness among class members with
respect to their injuries, the absence of which can preclude certification.”); Catron v. City of St.
Petersburg, No. 8:09-cv-923-T-23EAJ, 2010 WL 917609, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2010); Blackman v.
District of Columbia, 633 F.3d 1088, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ([U]nder (b)(2), “class claims must be
‘sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation’ . . . cohesiveness is a significant
touchstone of a (b)(2) class” (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997))).
178. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 171 at § 4:34.
179. Id. (citing Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3rd Cir. 1998)).
180. Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California, 137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017).
181. TIMOTHY E. EBLE, THE FEDERAL CLASS ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL § 23 (1999).
182. Id. at § 24.
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plaintiffs going forward. The case is already having a significant enough
effect on district court cases, to the detriment of plaintiffs, to actually alter
case outcomes. And 23(b)(3) class actions will have even greater
difficulty being certified because defendants will highlight the
jurisdictional factor of 23(b)(3)(C) in the predominance and superiority
discussion even more now. For these reasons, Bristol-Myers Squibb will
seemingly be a partial death knell for the certification of nationwide class
actions in subsequent years, even if it is not a complete barrier.
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